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Introduction
Since the publication of the Macmillan report in 1931, the impact of British financial institutions on corporate performance has received substantial and largely critical attention, not least from business and banking historians. 1 The core issue has centred on the so-called 'bank-industry divide', 2 while more recently the debate has spread to assessing the nature and extent of support provided by British financial institutions generally for domestic industry.
The critique of banks was prompted by the deep slump in activity across many of the older industries after 1921 that precipitated a decline in Britain's position in the global business landscape. 3 Since commercial banks maintained the closest relationship to domestic industry, they came under scrutiny for the role they ought to play in this scenario. 4 Based on these contemporary perceptions of 'industrial malaise' and the perceived responsibility of banks, numerous committees, reports and policies were convened and released to offer solutions.
The Macmillan report was just one of many which aimed to rectify the so-called 'divide' and control financial sector behaviour. 5 Although later in the twentieth century Lindgren noted that 'the functional and organizational boundaries delimiting banks on the one hand and 2 manufacturing industry on the other, are becoming indistinct', 6 numerous historical evaluations have been conducted which provide varied explanations for the perceived and actual extent of the links between financial institutions and industrial investment and strategy.
The recent work of Turner, Acheson et al. and Higgins et al. also demonstrates that the discussion of the shifting relationship between financial institutions and industrial companies is still highly relevant to the study of British business in the twentieth century. 7 This article will provide fresh perspectives on the debate about finance-industry relations by using a novel methodology of studying the inter-organisational relationships and corporate networks. 8 Covering a period which started just after the concentration of British banking and finishing when financial institutions generally were regarded as highly influential within the British corporate network, 9 and by using a database of board directors across the top 250 British companies based on net assets (200 non-financial and 50 financial, both listed and unlisted), it will be possible to demonstrate the level of contact between and within sectors. 10 Four benchmark years (1904, 1938, 1958 and 1976) have been chosen, allowing the network to be viewed at different critical periods of change and development in British business. The data also allows for centrality measurement using the Freeman degree (which is the sum of the shortest paths from a singular node), indicating which companies were most connected within the network as a whole, as well as an examination of the composition of connections and what this might indicate about their inter-and intra-organizational activity.
Starting with some insights into the methodology and data employed in this analysis, the article then outlines the role of a board of directors and potential impact of interlocking directorships. The article will then provide brief contextual material on the evolution of Britain's major financial institutions and their changing relationship with the rest of the top 250 firms. These sections will highlight a series of questions that will be addressed when 3 examining each sample year, demonstrating how this research differs from other work on finance-industry links. Specifically, it is essential to explain how historians' previous preoccupation with clearing banks needs to be moderated by incorporating an analysis of the many other financial institutions which participated in the British corporate network.
Additionally, because these varied financial institutions were participating in British business as a collective and the networks they possessed through board-level interlocks dictated the movement of resources, both tangible and intangible, they became increasingly essential participants in British business, thus warranting further analysis. Secondly, these changes need to be linked with a significant shift in the patterns of ownership of major British business. Thirdly, one must assess the density and quality of connections within the British corporate network over time, identifying any changes that took place and the reasons behind them. Importantly, what this study provides is a unique survey of corporate connectivity across all sectors which can provide deep insights into inter-and intra-sectoral connectivity over most of the twentieth century. Through network graphs, this study offers the opportunity to visualise lines of communication and flows of resources across boards, industries and British business as a whole, something that has not been done before. More specifically, we highlight occurrences of regional clustering, recurring and ongoing relationships, cartelisation and industry preference amongst interlocks. At the centre of our study is a focus on financeindustry relationships; by isolating the connections of each financial company in the network for each year, we are able to identify wider trends related to financial sector linkages and isolate potentially unique relationships for further study. While further research is required at the micro-level in order fully to understand the nature and impact of these changes on individual firms and the economy as a whole, this article provides a solid foundation on which to develop fresh perspectives on a range of issues related to the evolution of British business in the twentieth century.
Methodology and Dataset
In this work, we adopt network visualisation and characteristic analysis as a novel approach to studying inter-organisational relationships. Understanding the shape, form and function of networks is important in understanding a host of characteristics of relationships which cannot be explained through other forms of organization (that is, markets, hierarchies or other empirically-based forms of analysis). Networks help one understand relationships which are not purely formalized, which cannot be predicted and which are likely to change over time. where policy was quickly changing and new financial players were taking on a greater role in British business. These sample years allow us to assess the network before and after stages of instability, crisis and transformation (i.e. merger waves, policy implementation, etc.), thereby revealing the impact of some of these events. In addition to this, selecting the top 250 companies by net assets allows us to view connectivity amongst the largest players in British business who had the status and capital to shape much of the business landscape through the twentieth century.
We examine several different characteristics of the network. Firstly, the Freeman degree is used, allowing us to measure centrality and network density. This can indicate highly connected companies as well as the level of integration within the network as whole. In instances of high connectivity, it also allows us to determine the presence of a so-called 'big linker', that being an individual who held many board seats often in what is termed a 'figurehead' role. 14 Secondly, we have also isolated the ties of each financial institution in the network to determine how integrated they were in the network as a whole, as well as determine the nature of their connections, viz., were they largely inter-or intra-sectoral? Did they connect with many companies in the same industry? Were they connected to regionally significant companies, and finally, did these connections repeat in multiple benchmark years? These connections and the accompanying analysis provide a view of major changes in British business through an alternate and unique perspective, while also highlighting the opportunity for further research into particularly interesting clusters and other networked relationships.
Role of the board and interlocks
As this article will be focusing on large British companies, it is important from the outset to establish that the board of directors represented the key mechanism for corporate control. 15 The key board functions included management, oversight and service. 16 Consequently, its composition will reveal the company's mode of control and whether this is shaped by what Scott refers to as a 'constellation of interests', 17 namely, senior executives, financiers, shareholders and non-executives from other industries. 18 In the early-twentieth century context, at a time when as a direct result of merger activity many large-scale firms experienced significant growth, 19 and board size was growing considerably 20 , its role was brought into sharp focus. Quail has demonstrated that while the 1908
Companies Act provided greater clarification about the role of directors, and specifically recognised the existence of a managing director, boards were 'increasingly becoming self-perpetuating oligarchies'. 21 At the same time, share ownership in the largest companies was already highly dispersed, minimising the potential influence of owners, while shareholder attendance at company meetings was in decline. 22 This resulted in the emergence of a 'proprietorial' structure which was intrinsically hierarchical, with the board of directors controlling all aspects of a company's activities, even though they owned a tiny fraction of its equity. Moreover, these characteristics persisted well into the twentieth century. Hannah has described the inter-war era as 'the golden age of directorial power', while up to the 1970s only superficial changes took place in this respect, given the extensive adoption of a holding company structure across many sectors. 23 This reinforces our earlier claim that an analysis of board composition provides a deep understanding of the nature of British corporate decision-making over the period 1904-76, given the dominant role played by directors in fashioning corporate structure.
While Cassis rightly argues that the impact of particular directors (and notably bank directors) on the boards of other companies varied and needs to be handled on an individual basis, by looking at the corporate network as a whole it is nevertheless possible to draw some conclusions. 24 As an interlock represents an interest between two companies, it is safe to assume in most cases that when the director who works for a financial institution sits on the board of an industrial company this relationship was either a 'capital relation' or a 'personal relation', where personal includes figurehead directors who hold multiple seats and do so because of status and often access to important personal contacts. 25 On the other hand, links between two financial companies are potentially even more complex, as they could either reflect financial interests or directors could have been placed there to monitor corporate behaviour, or again to act as a figurehead. Although boards impact on strategic decisions, determine capital flows and monitor the decisions of top management, the emphasis on each could shift depending on the board members' prerogative. 26 Board decisions could also determine objectives and ensure business operations are focused on achieving these objectives. 27 Furthermore, as Brayshay et al. argue: 'Examination of interlocks provides an initial basis for analyses of how social networks may have influenced company activity'. 28 Other directorships held by so-called 'big linkers' had the potential to influence the mode of decision-making or the accumulated knowledge they brought to a particular board. The various roles of directors and accrued benefits that come as a result of experience, contacts and access to capital could also be analysed within a resource-based view. 29 Toms, Wilson and Wright, for example, examine the way in which inter-organisational networks in the private equity sector and beyond help corporations and boards to accrue 'rents' such as human capital and other resources. 30 Outside of the interlock network, a director's informal links to the business world via friendships, club membership, family associates and similar relationships also played a significant role in shaping their influence on a given board. In our sample, we discover a number of individuals identified as 'big-linkers' and whose presence on a given board would pertain primarily towards increasing status and visibility of the company. Table 1 8 details the number of directors with the highest number of board seats (ranging from four to seven) for each of the sample years, demonstrating that most were individuals with particularly high status in Britain.
Table 1. 'Big-linkers' in each of the sample years
From a non-figurehead perspective, Holmes and Ploeckl have shown that outside directors had the ability to submit proposals on subjects as diverse as restructuring, financial requirements, and mergers. 31 For example, banks interlocked with one or more steel firms had the ability to propose amalgamation if one or all of the firms to which they were connected ran into problems, and especially those which accumulated excessive bank debt.
Significantly, they argue that 'networking between a bank's clients and interlocking directorates with steel firms were two important conduits British banks could have used to shape industry concentration'. 32 The proximity of banks to industry (particularly commercial banks and later other financial institutions) made a board-level connection between the two a seemingly natural move. In an ideal situation, this would allow banks and other financial institutions to monitor advances and gain an understanding of firm capital requirements. 33 In addition, as certain financial institutions started to act as financial advisors to industry in the post-war period, this relationship experienced a distinct intensification. This was especially true for London-based banks, because they knew little about the company to which they were loaning money, or indeed the industry as a whole. One of the ways directors sought to be actively involved in industrial firms was by acting as 'delegated monitors', which required as much information-gathering on the company as possible, while alternatively financial institutions could seek to appoint a non-executive director to the board of a given industrial company. 34 For example, Lloyds did this with Consett Iron Co. in 1959. 35 While most boards still reflected the 'club atmosphere' entrenched in the organisations centred on the City of London, the extent of the interlocks between financial and industrial companies increased significantly up to the 1970s, highlighting the need to examine the nature of this relationship and the cross-sectoral linkages.
Finance and Industry in the twentieth century
Before going on to conduct a detailed analysis of the database, however, and although an abundant literature exists to outline key developments, it would be useful briefly to provide a broader financial context in which the corporate networks operated. 36 In particular, it is important to emphasise how by the start of the twentieth century the bulk of British financial activity was centred on the City of London. While provincial stock exchanges in
Manchester and Glasgow continued to operate for several decades, once the banking sector had been centralized in London 37 and the London Stock Exchange came to dominate the market for corporate ownership, British financial activities were largely controlled by the City of London. 38 As British business was also increasingly dominated by merger activity, resulting in the creation of ever-larger firms in all sectors of the economy, 39 The debate relating to the impact of this relationship has raged throughout the twentieth century. On the one hand, as many financial institutions had failed to develop deep relationships with British industry, their capacity to influence strategy was limited. 45 Tilba and McNulty have also emphasised the disengagement that characterised the relationship between institutional investors and the firms in which they invested millions of pounds. 46 From the inter-war era, given the acute difficulties experienced by staple industries such as textiles, coalmining, steel and shipbuilding, 47 this led many to believe that British industry was in need of major restructuring. 48 Specifically, there was a growing clamour in favour of financial institutions offering not only funds, but also advice and knowledge. 49 The
Macmillan committee set up to encourage bank involvement in the industrial sector and aid in its restructuring was but the most prominent of these voices. 50 It is apparent, however, that while banks had actually been lending large amounts to industry in the form of overdrafts and other short-term instruments, little in the way of effective rationalisation occurred in the 1930s. As Garside and Greaves note, while there was some evidence of bank-led merger activity in Britain, the implementation of industrial rationalisation across industries suffering from decline (particularly cotton, coal and shipbuilding) was more evident in official documents than in practice. 51 This lack of actual rationalisation activity re-enforced Hilferding's thesis regarding the divergent interests of financial institutions and the needs of manufacturing industry. 52 Indeed, as this paper will show, while financial institutions and industrial customers were increasingly involved in each other's companies through board interlocks, there is little evidence of a deep understanding of respective needs.
As the general economic environment changed markedly after the 1940s, the post- In terms of network centrality (see Table 2 ), the core of the network was occupied Steamship. This trend is in line with recent findings regarding the geographic spread of shareholders and the continuation of region-specific, bank-industrial relationships, something which the more centralised City banks were unlikely to possess. 60 On the other hand, Cassis argues that despite bank amalgamations, bankers from provincial banks involved in largescale mergers managed to retain these regional links. 61 For example, John Spencer Phillips, chairman of Lloyds, was on the Board of Directors of Shrewsbury Gas Light Co due to a previous relationship formed when he had been a banker at Shrewsbury-based Beck & Co.
(absorbed by Lloyds in 1880). Despite the continued absorption of smaller or private banks by the larger commercial banks through the first half of the twentieth century, many of the networks created by these smaller enterprises proved to be resilient. 62 Although the financial sector appears to have been the most interlocked, many of these interlocks remain intra-sectoral and primarily between banks and insurance companies.
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The presence of bankers on insurance boards, and vice versa, was symptomatic of an oldestablished relationship as the two industries had been linked for over a century. 63 This board-level relationship allowed for a channel of advice regarding investments and technical issues connected to more practical, insurer-client relationships. As both banks and insurance companies continued to indulge in intense merger waves over the course of the twentieth century, these interlocks also multiplied, creating an intimate community within the City of London. On the other hand, it was not until later in the century that substantial links between City-based financial institutions and domestic industrial concerns emerged, especially with regard to staple industries such as coalmining, textiles and steel, largely because the latter continued to rely on regional sources of capital and they were slow to adopt amalgamated corporate structures. England encouraged a close-knit, non-competitive banking environment which created a highly cartelised structure amongst the City-based institutions. 68 This trend also continued over the following three decades, with the Bank of England purposely limiting competition and restricting speculative investment activity. While we have already noted the significance of merger activity in certain industrial sectors, and especially in cotton textiles, steel and coalmining industries, it is also important to add that financial institutions actually played a significant role in stimulating 23 amalgamations. 70 In the case of steel, Holmes and Ploeckl have demonstrated that banks played a much larger role in rationalisation than previously thought. 71 They argue that nonexecutive bank directors on industrial boards often exercised decisive influence over corporate decision making. For example, Lord Pirrie of Midland Bank, who sat on the board of John Brown and Co. and Colvilles, submitted a scheme for amalgamation to the board.
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Beyond this, what the corporate network demonstrates is that by 1938 banks were playing a much larger role in many industrial sectors, and especially those considered to be in decline.
While this interlocking activity could have been a direct response to the Macmillan Report, it is more likely that banks which had been lending large amounts to industrial companies In the post-war years, despite remaining integrated, the network's core became slightly less dense, with an average Freeman degree of 13.8 and the percentage of firms with no connection to the network increasing to 25% ( Figure 3 and Table 4 ). One of the main reason behind this decline was the late-1940s nationalisation programme which saw two of the most networked industries (railways and coal) up to 1938 (Tables 2 and 3) Wales to three (all banks). This data also highlights the increased extent to which banks and insurance companies maintained their position as some of the most well-connected in the network. Related to this trend, the graph in figure 3 also demonstrates the increase in the number of marginal firms (up to 30% of the total), which consisted predominantly of nonfinancials and was directly correlated to the propensity of financials in this year to maintain intra-sectoral ties. In terms of financial institutions' aggregate number of links within the network, over the 1940s and 1950s there was an increase in the number of intra-sectoral ties, especially amongst smaller banks, trusts and insurance companies. Legal and General had ties to five financial institutions and only one industrial firm, while National Bank Ltd had ties to two financial institutions and no industrial links. Although it seems surprising that Yorkshire
Bank had ties to thirteen financial institutions, including most of the 'Big Five' clearing banks, this arose from its recurring liquidity crises, prompting the Bank of England to encourage a syndicate of financial institutions to provide long-term support. 75 The trend toward intra-sectoral connectivity can also be observed in the activities of the larger banks, and especially National Provincial, which while maintaining plentiful ties to industrial firms, in 1958 had ten links to other financial institutions, compared to four in 1938. The propensity to increase intra-sectoral links came from a distinct upward domestic turn in economic activity in the 1950s, encouraging a much more inward-looking, cartelised form of corporate behaviour. At the same time, it is also vital to remember that banks did not abandon their industrial sector links, because even though the bulk of industrial investment was sourced from profits in the early to mid-1950s, it was still important to monitor liquidity issues. 76 Furthermore, increased intra-sectoral connectivity amongst financial institutions led to greater collaborative activity between financials which on occasion was used to facilitate capital flow to struggling industrials. 77 Thomas has also demonstrated that bank advances to industry, in particular to manufacturing, increased from the late-1950s, rising at an even greater rate in 82 Furthermore, Barclays, which had possessed a largely international focus in the inter-war years, in 1958 was tied to a number of British manufacturing firms such as Vickers and several financial institutions. This also undermines Coates' claim that banks sustained a largely international focus and neglected domestic industry. 83 Despite growing intra-sectoral links across the financial sector, it appears in the post-World War II era that banks had not abandoned their industrial board ties, maintaining a close relationship with a number of sectors such as steel, chemicals, textiles and tobacco.
d. 1976
As the need for external finance increased in the 1970s, largely because of intensifying international competition and a challenging domestic macro-economic climate 29 which included rising inflation, a secondary banking crisis and a collapse in property values, financial institutions increased their interlocked relationship with industrial companies. 84 By 1976, the core of the network had nearly returned to its pre-war density, with an average Freeman degree of 15.4, even though the number of financials in the core had declined from sixteen to thirteen. It is also clear from Table 5 reports on banking practice, commercial banks in these last three benchmark years (1938, 1958 and 1976 ) appeared willing to connect and interact with industrial companies at board level.
Having noted this significant conclusion, it is nevertheless essential to stress that the biggest change to the finance-industry relationships at this time was the increasing presence of institutional investors as stakeholders in industrial companies, with pension funds, Table 5 ), by that time institutional investors owned over half of the quoted equity, compared to 28% for individuals.
Having linked the first two issues, perhaps the third issue relating to the changing density of the British corporate network highlights a series of issues worthy of further research. Table 6 summarises these changes, indicating a tendency towards increased density.
In this context, however, 1938 stands out as an aberration, with the lowest proportion of disconnected firms and highest Freeman index. Of course, in 1904 the corporate network had not developed very extensively, in spite of the extensive divorce between control and ownership amongst Britain's largest firms. 90 Nevertheless, it is still surprising to note that both indicators of density were higher in 1938 than any other sample year. This revelation can only be explained by both the acute interwar uncertainties affecting especially the staple industries (cotton textiles, coalmining, steel and shipbuilding) and the depth of the 1929-31 economic crisis, persuading the clearing banks especially to increase their links with largescale firms (see Table 3 ). Moreover, as Tables 4 and 5 indicate, these links were sustained up to the 1970s. On the other hand, it is also noticeable that although institutional investors were relegated down Table 3 , each of them had more interlocking directorships than in 1904. In certain respects, while this was certainly influenced by growing board size, when we highlight the actual composition of these ties they reveal the much closer relationship that financial institutions generally developed with large industrials from the 1920s. Another factor to bear in mind when emphasising the aberrant nature of the 1938 data in Table 6 is that as a direct result of the late-1940s nationalisation programme affecting coalmining and railways especially, some of the most connected sectors of the early-twentieth century were eliminated from the corporate network. Another important dimension of the changing density of the British corporate network is the nature of the linkages, in that Table 6 fails to indicate whether the links were intra-or inter-sectoral. While considerable attention has been placed on the connections between financial institutions and other large-scale British firms, it is worth remembering that the former were just as interested in extensive intra-sectoral linkages. As we noted earlier, there had since the early-nineteenth century been strong links between provincial clearing banks and insurance companies, largely because they were created and owned by similar groups of entrepreneurs. By the 1950s, however, most sectors within the financial sector had developed strong intra-sectoral links, at least partially stimulated by the Bank of England's desire to create a highly cartelised structure that was regarded as more stable, a policy that remained in place until the early-1970s. At the same time, there is only limited evidence of intra-sectoral linkages in other industries, even though between the 1930s and 1960s many British companies were signatories to extensive trade association arrangements.
The overriding conclusion from this research, however, is that there was an increasingly close relationship between financial institutions and the rest of the top 250 firms, as manifested in both changing ownership patterns, intra-sectoral support clusters and larger numbers of interlinking directorships. Moreover, these manifestations were directly connected, given the desire of clearing banks and other significant financial players to monitor the ever-larger sums of money that had either been lent or invested. As Sue Bowden
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suggests in a study of the crisis at Rolls Royce in the late 1960s, while shareholder exit was certainly apparent in this case, the community of financial institutions including merchant bank Lazards were instrumental in coercing change at this company. 91 One must consequently regard financial intra-sectoral links as just as significant as finance and industry links to the shape and structure of British business. Of course, it is difficult at this stage to assess what lessons historically we can learn from the actions and relationships of financial institutions, given the need for more extensive micro-level research in order fully to understand the nature and impact of these changes on individual firms and the economy as a whole. While the general impression arising from the literature on bank-industry relationships is largely negative, it would be essential to analyse the extent to which firms relied on this relationship, the nature of the advice provided by financiers sitting on their boards, and the impact these had on corporate performance. Network analysis and graph visualisations have allowed for the novel drawing out of some of these important relationships which could have significant implications for future research paths. This foundation has also allowed for the illumination of significant trends, for example, long-term industry-finance relationships, regional clusters and the prevalence of overseas companies in the network. By highlighting these relationships and trends, one can pinpoint areas in which archival research should be undertaken. Given the vast spread of business records through the UK and rest of the world, using the network to highlight firms, groups of firms or key relationships which were potentially significant can aid in narrowing archival searches. Additionally, it also provides indicators of industry-specific connectivity and change; while we have focused on industryfinance links in this article, further studies may focus on specific sectors within the wider context of the network, such as retail, pharmaceuticals or automotive industries.
Furthermore, this article has opened the door for further studies of other benchmark years, including those that stretch back in time and forward into more recent decades,
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providing an even broader context for changing patterns in British business. Given the significant changes which have occurred in the British financial sector to the present date and the recent publications by John Turner and Ranald Michie, it might be timely to examine the corporate network in more current years. 92 This article has laid important groundwork for a discussion of corporate connectivity, board-level interactions and the wider implications of inter-sectoral relationships, opening the door for future research into the intricate relationships between directors at board level and what implications these had for company strategy and performance over the short-and long-run.
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